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TOWARD A MORE COMMUNITARIAN 
FUTURE? FUKUY AMA AS THE 
FUNDAMENTALIST SECULAR HUMANIST 
June Carbone* 
OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION. By Francis Fukuyama. New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 2002. Pp. xiii, 256. $25. 
With The End of History and the Last Man,' Francis Fukuyama2 
established himself as the prophet of liberal democracy and free mar­
kets, heralding their triumph as the only form of governance capable 
of commanding legitimacy. Asked to reflect on his predictions a 
decade later, Fukuyama concluded that the greatest threat to liberal­
ism comes from biotechnology because it alone has the potential to 
remake the human nature that liberal democracy was designed to 
serve. Fukuyama makes a compelling case that biotechnology may 
produce developments that should concern us; he is ironically less 
persuasive in articulating a liberal-democratic framework for govern­
ing the developments he fears. 
Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology 
Revolution is provocative. It establishes the breadth of the threat 
Fukuyama perceives by linking four areas of biotechnology rarely 
discussed together: neuroscience and the ability to determine the 
genetic basis of traits like homosexuality or intelligence, pharmacology 
and the transformation of human psyches made possible by drugs such 
as Ritalin or Prozac,3 the potential to unlock the secrets of aging that 
could usher in revolutionary changes in demographics, and genetic 
* Presidential Professor of Ethics and the Common Good, Santa Clara University 
School of Law. A.B. 1975, Princeton; J.D. 1978, Yale. - Ed. I would like to thank Bill Black, 
Brad Joondeph, and Margaret McLean for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this 
Review, and Armando Pastran, Jr. for his research assistance. I would also like to thank the 
Santa Clara University Center for Science and Technology for its support. 
1. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) [hereinaf­
ter FUKUYAMA, END OF HISTORY]. 
2. Dean of Faculty and Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political 
Economy, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins 
University. 
3. Fukuyama links Ritalin, one of a number of drugs used to treat attention 
deficit-hyperactivity disorder, to "overt . . .  social control," p. 46, and describes the antide­
pressant Prozac as affecting "that most central of political emotions, the feeling of 
self-worth, or self-esteem," p. 44. 
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engineering with its prospect of designer babies. Examined individu­
ally, each of these developments has the potential to relieve human 
suffering. Considered collectively, Fukuyama argues, they threaten to 
alter fundamentally human nature. 
Given the breadth of the challenge, Fukuyama maintains that it is 
essential to consider not just the propriety of individual applications, 
but the governance of biotechnology more generally. His clarion call, 
to weigh the implications of the decentralized, globalized, free markets 
in which decisions on such technologies might otherwise be made, is in 
many ways prescient. Such decisions produced the revolution in 
information technology and information technology in turn acceler­
ated the decentralization of power associated with it. Public discussion 
of the implications of the new technology is occurring only now that 
the information-technology revolution is largely complete. 
Biotechnology, in contrast, touches more directly on people's 
hopes and fears than the computing power of the next generation of 
silicon chips. Biotechnology, after all, involves food, drugs, and medi­
cines. It is no accident that one of the first of the alphabet agencies 
that became the hallmark of the regulatory state was the Food and 
Drug Administration ("FDA"). Authorized in 1906, the FDA 
appeared a generation earlier than the New Deal institutions associ­
ated with government growth. It is similarly no accident that stem-cell 
research, though still in an embryonic stage, touched off a firestorm of 
controversy unlike anything in the computer world. In contrast, 
Napster, though fully developed, implemented, and dismantled, never 
commanded the attention of popes or presidents. Biotechnology is and 
will continue to be governed differently as it takes place within a 
heavily regulated marketplace far more dependent on government 
funding and approval and the vagaries of public support or condemna­
tion. 
If Fukuyama is therefore right that biotechnology presents a 
different type of challenge than information technology and prescient 
in his call for an examination of its governance, his book nonetheless 
disappoints in its examination of the framework for resolution. 
Fukuyama's project is incomplete, and it is understandable that he 
reserved a more detailed blueprint for other work. Less forgivable, 
however, is his failure to confront the problem central to governance: 
it may be necessary to destroy liberal democracy in order to save it or, 
more prosaically, it may be necessary to curtail scientific exploration 
and the application of lifesaving treatments to preserve human nature 
as Fukuyama defines it. 
The dilemma of stopping the threats to human nature without 
derailing the scientific freedom and curiosity central to it arises from 
two sources, one following from the way Fukuyama defines the threat 
and the other from the intrinsic nature of biotechnology. Fukuyama is 
concerned about anything that would undermine the human essence, 
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which he describes as the sum of human unity and continuity (pp. 130, 
172). He takes great pains to explain how an "ought" - thou shalt not 
alter human nature - can be derived from an "is" - our existing 
human nature establishes the values on which human institutions and 
judgments are based (pp. 114-17). He never quite says, however, what 
it is about human nature as it presently exists that is so valuable. In 
failing to do so, his reasoning becomes circular: we should not change 
human nature because doing so will necessarily change the values it 
produces. And changing those values appears to be wrong even if it 
makes us smarter, happier, and wiser - and inclined to value the 
improvements. 
Because Fukuyama's definition of the human essence is so elusive, 
it can be used to oppose anything that changes us or our societies. 
Modern sanitation or the transformation in women's roles have 
arguably altered human society as much as Prozac or a revolution in 
the treatment of aging. To prevent such broad-based changes, to 
forestall effects that result from the culmination of thousands of 
otherwise innocuous decisions, indeed, to return women to the kitchen 
or prevent parents from seeking Ritalin for their hyperactive children, 
requires a response as draconian as Marx's response to capitalism. If 
human values reflect the human condition, then only preserving 
human conditions in all their misery will preserve those values. In his 
zeal to defend the essence of what it means to be human, Fukuyama 
must necessarily be dogmatic in opposing scientific advances, however 
seemingly benign, that threaten it. Fukuyama has thus become a 
fundamentalist in his defense of secular humanism.4 
The dilemma for governance remains even if we relax Fukuyama's 
definition of the problem. Biotechnological innovations - the discov­
ery of the human genome, new drug treatments for AIDS, gene 
therapies - typically involve large initial investments in risky enter­
prises whose ultimate products may be hard to predict. Once the basic 
science has been developed, however, individual applications may be 
4. "Secular humanism" is a philosophy that "centers upon human concerns and employs 
rational and scientific methods to address [a] wide range of issues" and values. Fritz Stevens 
et al., What Is Secular Humanism?, Council for Secular Humanism, at http://www.secular 
humanism.org/intro/what.html (last updated Feb. 27, 2003). Fundamentalism, in contrast, is 
often associated with religious fundamentalism, and it has been defined as "do[ing] battle for 
fundamentals." Curtis Lee Law, WATCHMAN-EXAMINER (New York), July 1, 1920, at 9, 
cited in KARL KEATING, CATHOLICISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM: THE ATTACK ON 
"ROMANISM" BY "BIBLE CHRISTIANS" 17 (1988). The fundamentalists associated with a 
particular religion insist on adherence to what they view as the essential elements of that re­
ligion, and tend to be rigid and dogmatic in their interpretation of what the religion com­
mands. Id. Fukuyama is a secular humanist, first, in that he relies on secular rather than re­
ligious grounds for his conclusion, though he acknowledges that religious convictions can 
produce the same results. P. 91. Second, his arguments are clearly grounded within a ration­
alist tradition identified with the nature of what it means to be human. See infra Part II 
passim. He is nonetheless a "fundamentalist" in that he seeks to identify and preserve the 
fundamental or essential aspects of what it means to be human. Pp. 149-50. 
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relatively easy and inexpensive. AIDS drugs that cost a billion dollars 
to develop may be duplicated for pennies. Promising scientific devel­
opments may therefore be relatively easy to derail while their more 
questionable applications may be impossible to stop. 
Although Fukuyama's prescriptions are mild ones - preventing, 
for example, preimplantation-embryo selection to favor world-class 
sprinters - his call to action is most likely to empower those who 
oppose broad categories of scientific research (p. 211). Consider the 
potential of stem-cell research. If the secrets of embryonic develop­
ment will facilitate the existence of athletes with greater endurance, 
Fukuyama will oppose the development. But where would he draw the 
line: At prohibition of the basic research that might also lead to new 
techniques to fight heart disease? At public funding of animal trials? 
At implementation in humans? And more fundamentally, who is to 
decide? Fukuyama's greatest failing in Our Posthuman Future is that 
he does not convincingly address the question of whether governance 
of biotechnology on the terms he advances is possible at all. 
The obstacle to Fukuyama's project comes from human nature 
itself. We are messy, stubborn, contentious beings, with authoritarian 
tendencies that require constant vigilance - or so Fukuyama argues 
in his other work.5 In a monograph that he wrote for the Rand 
Corporation in 1999 that summarized the results of his early research 
for this book, Fukuyama argued that information technology had 
produced a rapidly changing, globalized, decentralized, privatized 
world that had outflanked the possibility of government control.6 
Yet, Fukuyama's project - to prevent the overuse of Prozac, the 
prolongation of life expectancy, the. preimplantation selection of 
healthier embryos - requires a degree of government regulation at 
odds with the developments Fukuyama describes in his other work. 
And while he personally favors nuanced determinations that distin­
guish creation of bioengineered mathematicians from treatments for 
dyslexia, it is not so clear either that those sitting next to him on 
government-created bioethics panels will share the same views, or that 
he can really stop the developments he opposes without derailing the 
basic research that makes them possible.7 In a book that celebrates 
5. See FUKUYAMA, END OF HISTORY, supra note 1, passim. Fukuyama characterizes 
human nature as violent, pp. 154, 329, locked in a struggle for recognition that includes the 
assertion of superiority and a desire for tyranny as well as self-respect, p. 184, and concludes 
that only liberal democracy can keep these forces in balance, p. 338. 
6. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA & CAROLINE S. WAGNER, INFORMATION AND BIOLOGICAL 
REVOLUTIONS: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES - SUMMARY OF A STUDY GROUP 
ix-x (1999). 
7. Pp. 208-11. For example, Fukuyama, who rails against the use of Ritalin to treat 
behavior within a normal range, nonetheless acknowledges that there are children at the end 
of the distribution who are so hyperactive that "normal functioning is impossible," and "it is 
hard to object to treating them with Ritalin." P. 210. He emphasizes the need to draw the 
line between enhancement and therapy even when ambiguous. P. 210. 
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and tries to preserve human nature, Fukuyama does not seriously con­
sider how that nature will inevitably influence the shape and success of 
his efforts. 
This Review considers the implications of Fukuyama's work for 
the future regulation of biotechnology. First, the Review maintains 
that Fukuyama is almost certainly right that biological innovations 
span a continuum of developments that range from vitamins enhanc­
ing infant cognition to research unlocking the secrets of cellular aging. 
Second, the Review argues that the value of Fukuyama's analysis 
cannot lie in the pre�ision of his prescriptions, which are in any event 
vague. Instead, discussion of human nature can contribute to a 
reexamination of how technology can serve human institutions. 
Biotechnology has potentially dangerous implications precisely 
because it may transform us and because we are likely to make 
decisions about its implementation on the basis of our most primal 
emotions - hope, fear, love, grief, and the desire for immortality. The 
insight into human nature most critical for biotechnology's future is 
the one that explains how individually unobjectionable decisions may 
produce collective calamities. 
Finally, the Review considers. the prospects for a different ap­
proach to biotechnology's governance. Many of the most controversial 
developments Fukuyama describes - use of the nuclear-cell transfer 
technology associated with cloning, selection of embryos with 
desirable traits - have already been done in readily moveable fertility 
clinics with a small amount of private funding from a determined 
clientele. The potential applications with the greatest promise, how­
ever - such as genetically modified plants that address the nutritional 
needs of the developing world, or breakthroughs in the use of stem 
cells to treat paralysis, cancer, or diabetes - require public funding 
and/or a large measure of international acceptance. Fukuyama 
correctly observes that we do not have the infrastructure necessary to 
either promote or control these developments (p. 215). Whatever our 
conclusions about the wisdom of the new technology, we are far 
behind in developing political oversight capable of even keeping track 
of the new developments' scientific, ethical, and social implications. 
Reconnecting political participation with scientific innovation will be 
biotechnology's greatest challenge. 
I. WHAT IS BIOTECHNOLOGY? NATURE, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS 
Fukuyama's concern about a "posthuman future" grows less from 
his understanding of science than his understanding of politics. He 
sprung to international fame with a book entitled The End of History 
and the Last Man, which argued that information technology had 
helped spur the collapse of communism and a convergence toward 
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liberal democracy and free markets around the globe.8 In Our 
Posthuman Future, Fukuyama identifies biotechnology, and the poten­
tial transformation of human nature, as the single greatest threat to 
the triumph of liberal democracy. Fukuyama argues that: 
human nature exists, is a meaningful concept, and has provided a stable 
continuity to our experience as a species. It is, conjointly with religion, 
what defines our most basic values. Human nature shapes and constrains 
the possible kinds of political regimes, so a technology powerful enough 
to reshape what we are will have possibly malign consequences for lib­
eral democracy and the nature of politics itself. (p. 7) 
His definition is thus a political rather than a scientific or ethical one. 
Fukuyama's political focus allows him to unite several seemingly 
disparate developments. Underlying all of them is an increasing 
understanding of how the human body works and how it can be 
changed to produce not only better health, but different behavior. 
Fukuyama picks four areas to illustrate the process. First, he considers 
the "sciences of the brain" (pp. 18-40). He examines our greater 
understanding of the link between genetics and behavior, and 
speculates about the coming ability to identify, for example, those with 
a "gay gene" and techniques designed to counter or eliminate its 
expression.9 Magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI"), which allows 
scientists to serve the brain in operation, similarly offers the potential 
to identify individuals with the "wrong" sexual tendencies, and to 
measure the effectiveness of efforts to "reprogram" them.10 Fukuyama 
emphasizes that the challenge is just as great if the decision to imple­
ment these technologies comes from parents choosing a particular 
future for children as it does when the decision comes from the state 
(p. 40). 
Second, and perhaps most prominently, Fukuyama analyzes 
neuropharmacology. Prozac and Ritalin provide his most cited exhib­
its. Over 10% of Americans are already on Prozac, an antidepressant 
colloquially described as a "happiness pill" (p. 46), and 12% of 
Medicaid recipients between the ages of two and four were on stimu-
8. FUKUY AMA, END OF HISTORY, supra note 1, at xii-xiii. 
9. Fukuyama refers, for example, to research on the importance of hormones in utero, 
and considers the possibility that introduction of testosterone at a critical point in male fetal 
development might counter the expression of a gene associated with same-sex sexual attrac­
tion. Pp. 39-40. 
10. Fukuyama devotes greater attention to the links between heredity and IQ and gen­
der and behavior than he does to neuroscience, perhaps because the latter field has only re­
cently been garnering attention. Pp. 20-40 passim. Nonetheless, studies of brain imaging may 
contribute as much as studies of genetics to predicting human behavior. See, e.g., Erica 
Goode, Brain Imaging May Detect Schizophrenia in Early Stages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002, 
at A32 (stating that brain imaging may be used to predict who will develop schizophrenia 
and to determine the effectiveness of early treatment); Wendy Kaminer, Gender Bender, 
AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 9, 2002, at 9 (discussing gender differences in neurological 
functioning). 
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!ants such as Ritalin in one midwestern study (p. 51). No science 
fiction, no new discoveries are necessary; we are already remaking our 
psyches. 
Third, Fukuyama highlights the science of aging, and the demo­
graphic revolution underway on the basis of existing medical 
advances. Life expectancy in the United States rose over the course of 
the last century from 48.3 years for men and 46.3 for women in 1900 to 
74.2 and 79.9 years for men and women, respectively, in the year 2000 
(p. 57). Existing trends suggest that the median age in the U.S. will rise 
to 40 by the middle of this century, and to 54 in Germany, 56 in Japan, 
and 58 in Italy (p. 61). The race is on to find a genetic shortcut to 
prolonging life, and research has already provided important insights 
into the nature of cellular aging (pp. 58-60). If these investigations hit 
pay dirt, life expectancy could double or more. These increases in life 
expectancy and the decreases in fertility are already creating more 
rigid, more conservative, and more female societies. 
Finally, Fukuyama addresses the implications of genetic engineer­
ing (pp. 72-83). Parents can now select which fertilized eggs to implant 
based on characteristics such as the absence of a disease-causing gene 
or the presence of a match for a sibling in need of a donor. With 
greater understanding of the relationship between genes and intelli­
gence, violence, and sprinting speed, parents may be able to design the 
children of their choice (pp. 76-82). 
Our Posthuman Future emphasizes that the result of these changes 
is cumulative (pp. 81-82). With better understanding of genetics, we 
can more effectively choose among possible offspring. With better 
ability to choose, we may accelerate demographic changes - increas­
ing height? - happening anyway. With wholesale changes, involving, 
for example, the elimination or biochemical suppression of the "gay 
gene," the organic causes of depression, and the physiological sources 
of aging, we will have fundamentally changed what it means to be 
human - and we may do so in incremental steps that we barely 
notice. 
II. WHAT IT MEANS TO BE POSTHUMAN: HUMAN NATURE AND 
NATURAL RIGHTS 
Fukuyama asks "Why Should We Worry?" What's wrong, after all, 
with taller, smarter, saner, blonder humans? Parents and patients, not 
governments, will make the choices. They presumably will choose bet­
ter futures for themselves and their offspring. The sum of suffering 
and disease will decline. The source of the cautionary note Fukuyama 
sounds in opposition is, in contrast to the potential benefits of 
biotechnological advances, maddeningly elusive. 
It is also easy to lampoon. Cass Sunstein begins his review of 
Fukuyama by quoting John Stuart Mill: "Nearly all the things which 
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men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's 
everyday performances."11 Ralph Brave, writing in The Nation, is less 
polite. Fukuyama defines "human nature" as "the sum of the behavior 
and characteristics that are typical of the human species, arising from 
genetic rather than environmental factors" (p. 130). He then argues 
that what we want to protect is "the full range of our complex, evolved 
natures against attempts at self-modification.· We do not want to 
disrupt either the unity or the continuity of human nature, and thereby 
the rights that are based on it" (p. 172). Brave is disdainful: 
Human nature is defined by . . .  human nature! To the extent that it is 
capable of being located in our material bodies, it is all that arises from 
our genetics. Any attempt at greater precision is a violation of our unity 
or continuity - and threatens to expose the author's empty hand. 
Through such sophistry, Fukuyama wishes to assert mastery over any 
biotechnological innovation that he considers threatening, since he can 
now arbitrarily choose when it is disruptive of the unity or continuity of . 
the human nature arising from our genetics. Even a heritable cancer 
could qualify for protection under Fukuyama's rubric for that which is to 
be defended from biotechnical intervention.12 
Fukuyama, however, does not mindlessly glorify the natural. He 
does not even oppose all use of Ritalin. Instead, the content in his 
message comes from the latter half of the sentence Brave quotes; the 
harm Fukuyama identifies is that which will come if we "disrupt either 
the unity or the continuity of human nature, and thereby [disrupt] the 
rights that are based on it" (p. 172; emphasis added). The key to his 
argument lies in the connection between human nature and human 
rights, and that connection rests on two component arguments. 
First, Fukuyama argues that "in the political realm we are required 
to respect people equally on the basis of their possession of Factor X" 
(p. 150). Aside from saying that Factor X is the essence of what it 
means to be human, Fukuyama does not provide much of a definition 
of human. Moreover, he acknowledges that we do not necessarily treat 
existing humans equally, as we assign different rights to children than 
to adults, to the mentally incompetent, etc. At the same time, he 
insists such differential treatment does not indicate lack of a human 
essence (pp. 173-74). Nonetheless, he clearly identifies that which he 
fears. A "brave new world" of genetically bred Alphas, Betas, 
Epsilons, and Gammas threatens the unity of human nature. Even Lee 
Silver, who advances libertarian arguments in favor of most prospec­
tive biotechnological innovations, is wary of the creation of a class of 
"GenRich" humans so genetically distinct - and superior - that they 
11. Cass R. Sunstein, Keeping Up With the C/oneses, NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 2002, at 32 
(reviewing Our Posthuman Future). 
12. Ralph Brave, The Body Shop, NATION, Apr. 22, 2002, at 25, 27 (reviewing Our 
Posthuman Future). 
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become a separate species.13 At the point where not just individuals 
but groups are bred to be different, the premise on which equal 
respect - and therefore equal rights - rests disappears.14 
Second, Fukuyama argues that our insistence on and willingness to 
recognize rights depends on human emotions. He maintains that "it is 
the distinctive gamut of emotions that produces human purposes, 
goals, objectives, wants, needs, desires, fears, aversions, and the like 
and hence the source of human values" (p. 169). For Fukuyama, these 
emotions bridge the gap between the "is" and the "ought." He 
observes: 
[T]here is scarcely a judgment of "good" or "bad" that has been pro­
nounced by a human being that has not been accompanied by a strong · 
emotion, whether of desire, longing, aversion, disgust, anger, guilt or 
joy . . . .  When we unearth the tortured body of a political prisoner in an 
authoritarian dictatorship, we pronounce the words bad and monstrous 
because we are driven by a complex gamut of emotions: horror at the de­
composed body, sympathy for the victim's sufferings and those of family 
and friends, and anger at the injustice of the killing. We may temper 
these judgments by rational consideration of mitigating circum­
stances . . . .  But the process of value derivation is not fundamentally a 
rational one, because its sources are the "is" of the emotions. (p. 117) 
Human nature is a source of rights because human nature 
produces the emotions that define our objectives and motivate our 
reactions. When we respond with horror to the tortured prisoner, our 
emotions produce an identification with the victim, and a determina­
tion to avenge the death or prevent the occurrence of similar wrongs. 
Fukuyama argues that human nature, through these emotions, 
prompts the moral opprobrium we attach to murder, and leads to the 
creation of rights to be free from torture, arbitrary imprisonment, and 
wrongful death. Change human nature, administer a tranquilizer that 
allows torture to be viewed with equanimity, interfere with the identi­
fication with the victim as an equal, and you will undermine the rights 
and values that follow from the strength of the emotional response. 
Prozac is as much a threat to human nature as genetic engineering 
because it alters the emotions that define and shape our values (p. 46). 
Our Posthuman Future resonates with Leon Kass's The Wisdom of 
Repugnance.15 In that article, Kass, now the chair of President Bush's 
13. See LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: CLONING AND BEYOND IN A BRA VE NEW 
WORLD 4-8 (1997). 
14. Fukuyama observes, for example, that "for believers in liberal equality, Factor X 
etches a bright red line around the whole of the human race and requires equality of respect 
for all of those on the inside, but attributes a lower level of dignity to those outside the 
boundary." P. 151. While he resists the efforts of other theorists to ascribe Factor X to God 
(i.e., to the creation of human beings in God's image and likeness), to Kant's emphasis on 
the capacity for moral choice, or to any other single factor, he emphasizes the importance of 
human dignity and equal respect as "the dominant passion of modernity." P. 149. 
15. Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1997, at 17. 
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bioethics council, argued against the morality of cloning partially on 
the basis of our instinctive repulsion at the prospect of human-genetic 
copies. Fukuyama's argument, however, is considerably more 
complex. He does not maintain that any particular emotion provides a 
determinate moral guide. Instead, he insists that it is the balance 
among competing interests that explains the evolution of human insti­
tutions. Fukuyama can argue that we have come to the "end of 
history" because "there is a logic to human history that ls ultimately 
driven by the priorities that exist among natural human desires, 
propensities, and behaviors" (p. 126). Murder is "natural," but so are 
the gallows. Human nature balances a desire for dominance with an 
appreciation of the security of property rights. Even globalization -
defined as "a world order in which mankind's largest in-groups no 
longer violently compete with one another for dominance but trade 
peaceably" (pp. 126-27) - can be seen as the logical product of a 
natural preference for positive-sum competition. Fukuyama's 
most fundamental book may not be so much The End of History and 
the Last Man, but Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of 
Prosperity.16 Trust - and prosperity - rest on the creation of institu­
tions designed to encourage untrustworthy beings to interact with each 
other. Make them more trustworthy, and you will eventually remake 
the institutions that protect them from each other. 
III. WHAT SHOULD WE Do? THE GOVERNANCE OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Fukuyama's argument is clever, distinctive, and very thin. If the 
problem with changing human nature is that it may change our values, 
why are those values special? Why do the values associated with this 
state of existence matter more than those associated with another 
state we may voluntarily choose? Without identification of the values 
that matter most, on the basis of something other than the conclusion 
that they are the product of our existing nature, Fukuyama's argument 
becomes circular. Although Fukuyama himself offers carefully 
measured proposals, the logic of his argument supports those who 
would limit promising biotechnology research now because of any 
future change they can envision. If, for example, daily aspirin contrib­
utes to longevity or vaccinations limit infant mortality, they too may 
have political effects that justify their restriction. Indeed, as conserva­
tive commentators insistently point out, a changing economy has 
transformed women's roles - and corresponding family values - at 
16. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF POSTERITY 
(1995). 
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least as fundamentally as Prozac, Ritalin, or the genetic engineering 
on the immediate horizon.'7 
The fog at the core of Fukuyama's argument is particularly 
pernicious because he fails to develop the connection between any 
particular avenue of research and the harm he envisions. Genetic 
engineering, for example, is probably the potential development with 
the broadest consensus against its implementation. Science-fiction 
writers as long ago as H.G. Wells could envision the breeding of 
human strains so distinct they become different species. 18 Fukuyama 
fears discoveries that may identify a genetic basis for intelligence or 
criminality almost as much. The existing genetic lottery creates a real­
life form of Rawls's original position.19 Even if, as a matter of statisti­
cal probability, the offspring of elite parents are more likely to share 
their elite characteristics than are the general population, the parents 
cannot be sure their genetic gifts will be passed on, and they cannot be 
certain that advantageous results are the product of inheritance as 
opposed to environment. If parents could guarantee offspring with the 
right gene combinations, or if they could determine in advance that it 
is futile to train a child who lacks the gene for world-class-sprinting 
speed, existing societal divisions might be exacerbated. The research 
thought likely to contribute to such a result, however, might also 
produce the opposite effect. 
Consider the rapidly growing body of information about the 
genetic basis of disease. Scientists trace families with hereditary forms 
of illness such as breast cancer. By comparing relatives with the 
disease to those without, they attempt to isolate the relevant genes or 
chromosomes. Sometimes, identification of the genetic culprit leads to 
abortion-based genetic screening or preventive measures such as 
mastectomies for the healthy. In other cases, however, identifying a 
particular disease-causing chromosome may lead to the discovery of 
the underlying mechanism causing the illness. If, for example, the 
relevant gene produces (or fails to produce) a particular protein, iden­
tification of that protein may be critical in fighting the disease, and 
17. Compare JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND 
REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW (2000), with FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT 
DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1999). 
Fukuyama, although perceptive in his discussion of the importance of norm formation to 
human nature, concluded with a mechanistic call for a return to traditional-family values 
without systematic recognition of the effect of changing women's roles on how those values 
are reached. Id. at x. 
18. H.G. WELLS, THE TIME MACHINE (1895); see also ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW 
WORLD (1946). 
19. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (describing original position as an 
imagined state in which people bargain without knowing their individual characteristics such 
as race, wealth, or gender). 
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it may lead to more effective treatments for both the genetic and 
nongenetic forms of the cancer.20 
The same thing may ultimately be true for more complex traits 
such as intelligence. Scientists may discover that a particular gene 
combination is associated with superior mathematical reasoning be­
cause of its contribution to the biochemical development of the brain. 
This could lead to the deliberate breeding of the mathematicians of 
the twenty-third century. It might also lead to early childhood inter­
ventions that enhance the mathematical functioning of the average 
child. Identification of the genetic sources of intelligence is the devel­
opment that most causes thoughtful observers to be wary. Yet, the 
result of such discoveries in the long run could conceivably increase 
equality in a manner similar to vaccinations (which compensate for the 
unequal genetic distribution of disease resistance), universal public 
education (which in some cases mitigates and in other cases exacer­
bates natural differences in ability), or the rapidly increasing under­
standing of the physiology of dyslexia (facilitating more accurate iden­
tification of dyslexics and new teaching strategies that increase 
dyslexics' success in learning to read). 
All biological advances have potentially differential effects for 
society. Discoveries about the links between nutrition, sanitation, and 
human flourishing, for example, first brought advantages to the elites, 
and continue to be a major source of inequality between the devel­
oped and the developing world. Few would argue, however, that the 
response ought to be to restrict sanitation in London as opposed to 
mounting a public-health campaign in Calcutta. If the most critical 
human-political value is equal dignity and respect, and if selective 
breeding is the potential scientific advance that most threatens it, 
there may still be no necessary connection between any particular line 
of research and the feared outcome. 
Fukuyama concentrates his energies in Our Posthuman Future on 
identification of the evils he fears, and construction of a revitalized 
natural-law justification for opposing them. He then encourages us to 
"think about the design of institutions that can make and enforce 
regulations on, for example, the use of preimplantation diagnosis and 
screening for therapeutic rather than enhancement purposes, and how 
those institutions can be extended internationally" (p. 211). Curiously, 
though, he does not develop the critique of human motivation and 
decisionmaking that has been the hallmark of his earlier work. And it 
is how biotechnological decisions are likely to be implemented, rather 
20. For a recent example of this, see Lara Jakes Jordan, Brain Defect Study Finds 
Mutation, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 1, 2002 , LEXIS, Academic Universe, N.Y. Times 
Library (stating that a newly discovered fatal-gene mutation, found only in Amish newborns, 
could be a major first step toward helping scientists prevent brain defects in babies 
worldwide). 
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than identification of the slippery slope of possible calamities, that of­
fers the greatest hope of designing appropriate structures for govern­
ance. 
Let us take, for example, use of the technology associated with 
genetic transfer. Scientists cloned Dolly the sheep by taking an egg 
from the womb of a sheep, destroying its nucleus, and replacing the 
egg nucleus with one from an adult sheep cell.21 The new egg was 
transplanted into the womb of a sheep who gave birth to an animal 
with the same nuclear DNA as the adult. Now compare two other 
forms of genetic transfer: 
- In the first, scientists extract the nucleus from the egg of a 
fertility patient, insert it into a donor egg whose nucleus has been 
removed, and add sperm from the patient's partner. The result is a 
fertilized egg, implanted in the patient's womb that produces a child 
genetically related to three parents: it has nuclear DNA from the 
intended mother and father, and mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA)22 
from the woman who donated the egg.23 This procedure permits a 
fertility patient with deteriorating cytoplasm or defective mtDNA to 
bear a healthy child.24 It also involves a germline-genetic alteration.25 
The child will pass on mitochondrial DNA from the donor to her 
offspring. 
21. See SILVER, supra note 13, at 107-10. 
22. DNA occurs in two places: the cell nucleus, and the cytoplasm surrounding the nu­
cleus. The nuclear DNA creates a person's inheritable traits. The cytoplasm contains 
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA), which, according to evolutionary theory, originated from a 
mitochondrian, a foreign cell capable of energy production that invaded the one-celled 
organism from which we descended. Subsequently, the two cells formed a symbiotic rela­
tionship because the mitochondrian provided energy and the host cell became a home for 
the mitochondrian cell. Since then, all of our cells have contained mtDNA, and rely on 
mitochondria to produce energy. See John Jain, T�e Future of Assisted Reproductive Tech­
nologies, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 435, 435-36 (1999). 
23. In the first efforts to address cytoplasmic defects, scientists sucked 5 % of the 
cytoplasm from the donor egg and inserted it into the cytoplasm of the patient's egg, where 
presumably the donor mtDNA and the patient's mtDNA combined. Subsequent tests 
confirmed that the baby "inherited" the donor's DNA in at least some of the cases where the 
technique was tried. John Mangels, Geneticists Jump Across Ethical Frontier, CLEVELAND 
PLAIN DEALER, May 21, 2001, at lA. Fertility specialists in New York then tried the 
technique described in the text, and inserted the patient's cell nucleus into a donor egg, 
whose nucleus had been destroyed. This technique, which involves the more classic form of 
nuclear transfer often banned by anticloning legislation, should have produced a child with 
mtDNA only from the donor. Erik Parens, Degrees of Engineering: Have Fertility 
Techniques Overtaken Ethical Concerns?, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1998, at CS. 
24. One reason many older women have trouble conceiving is that the cytoplasm in 
their eggs deteriorates with age. Other women have mitochondrial diseases that do not affect 
their nuclear DNA. See Jain, supra note 22, at 438-40. 
25. Most people think of germline alterations as manipulating genes in the nucleus of an 
embryo because mtDNA contains relatively little genetic material. Yet, switching mitochon­
dria would make a permanent and inheritable change in future descendants. Jain, supra note 
22, at 440. 
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- In the second, scientists take a cell from a diabetic child. They 
obtain an egg from a fertility-clinic donor. They destroy the egg 
nucleus, and insert the child's cell nucleus.26 The scientists then permit 
the egg, which contains the child's DNA, to develop in a petri dish 
long enough to harvest stem cells that can be coaxed into becoming 
pancreatic cells that the child needs to regulate his production of 
insulin. The stem cells, a genetic match, cure the child's diabetes 
without the risk of rejection. They do not, however, alter the DNA he 
will transfer to his offspring. 
The first example involves genetic alteration of a kind Fukuyama 
- along with many ethicists and legislators - strongly oppose. The 
second involves a less controversial technique, contentious more 
because of its destruction of the developing egg from which the stem 
cells are taken than because of its effect on the patient. Yet, the first 
has already been done in humans while the second has not. 
It is tempting to conclude that differences in regulation provide the 
primary part of the explanation. Fertility clinics are at the frontier of 
the medical profession, with virtually no federal funding - or 
oversight - and relatively little insurance coverage - or oversight. 
Universities, in contrast, rely on federal funding with all kinds of 
strings attached, and pharmaceutical companies need to convince the 
shareholders and venture capitalists who fund them that they can 
produce a marketable product worth the investment. Marketability, in 
turn, requires FDA approval or a measure of public acceptance that 
would be jeopardized by insensitivity to research protocols. 
The regulatory framework, however, is itself a product of the struc­
ture and financing of the underlying industry. How expensive is the 
basic research? Who does it? How far removed is implementation in 
humans from the initial discoveries? How willing are doctors and 
patients to try untested techniques? Stem-cell researchers working on 
diabetes could also escape existing regulatory scrutiny if they were 
willing to operate in decentralized, privately funded clinics. They do 
not because of the different financing and motivation at play in the 
two examples. The first scenario - involving mtDNA donation -
depended on the development of nuclear-transfer techniques financed 
by large-scale agricultural interests, and then implemented in humans 
by small clinics with a determined clientele. The British government, 
for example, through its Ministry of Agriculture, provided 65% of the 
funding that made Dolly, the first cloned mammal, possible. PPL 
26. For a description of this process, see Nicholas Wade, New Stanford Institute Is to 
Study Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1 2, 2002, at A3 7, which documents a research agenda for 
nuclear-transfer process. See also Status of the Implementation of the Fed. Stem Cell Research 
Policy: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 1 0-13 
( 2002) (Statement of Roger Pederson, Ph.D., Dep't of Surgery, Cambridge Univ.) ( describ­
ing promising diabetes research in mice using embryonic-stem cells to produce insulin). 
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Therapeutics, a Scottish biotechnology company, provided the rest.27 
The goal was not to clone humans, or even to cure disease. Instead, 
the institute involved in the research hoped to create precisely copied 
animals carrying proteins valuable in drugmaking or replicating high­
quality beef.28 Other companies, for example, have engineered goats 
to give milk containing human antibodies that can serve as medicines, 
and analysts speculate that a "single herd of goats may soon replace a 
$150 million drug factory."29 With governments supplying the funds 
for basic research, agricultural applications that increase farm produc­
tivity or facilitate the production of new drugs are big business. 
Once the basic science has been developed, however, its applica­
tion to human patients may be a relatively straightforward and 
inexpensive process. Little scientific innovation was involved in the 
fertility treatments treating the mitochondrial defects. Implementation 
required only willing doctors and consenting patients. The patients of­
ten have an intense relationship with fertility specialists, with both 
committed to one overriding goal - the production of a child. 
Maureen Ott, the first woman to bear a child using a donor's 
cytoplasm, told reporters: "When we were told by doctors that it was 
unlikely we would ever have children, we were not ready to believe 
that . . .. We wanted a baby so badly that we felt it was important to 
pursue every option available."30 After four failed efforts at in vitro 
fertilization, the Otts may well have felt that use of the experimental 
technique was their last chance to have a child to whom they would be 
genetically related. In such circumstances, it is easy to discount the 
risks. Mrs. Ott, when interviewed after her child's birth, insisted that: 
"I was never concerned about the risk of abnormality, based on what 
we were told. To me it seemed that the risk was no greater than it 
would have been in any birth for someone of my age. "31 The doctors, 
however, may be less sanguine. Dr. Jamie Grifo, the New York 
fertility specialist who has used nuclear-transfer techniques, was asked 
why he had not done safety testing first in monkeys. "Animal colonies 
cost a fortune to maintain," he said. And because there is a ban on 
federal-research money being spent on embryo research, "we have no 
27. Edith M. Lederer, Poll: Americans Oppose Human and Animal Cloning, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 4, 1997 (announcing that a $411,000 government grant would be 
cut in half), available at http://www.gene.ch/gentech/1997/8.96-5.97/msg00187.html. 
28. Id. 
29. Juan Enriquez & Ray A. Goldberg, Transforming Life, Transforming Business: The 
Life-Science Revolution, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 96, 99. 
30. Healthy Baby Born After World's First Succes.1jul Cytoplasmic Transfer, Bus. WIRE, 
July 18, 1997, WL, Business Wire Plus Database. 
31. Lois Rogers, Fertility Doctors Create Babies with Two Mothers, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), May 16, 1999, at 28. 
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research dollars."32 In the four years since the birth of the first child 
using these techniques, at least one has developed a serious develop­
mental disorder, and some researchers speculate that the conflict 
between the donor and the patient mtDNA might have caused the 
problem.33 There may be no way to know without carefully controlled 
trials that the clinics lack the money to fund. 
In contrast, stem-cell research involves high-caliber university re­
searchers, using proven clinical techniques, including animal experi­
mentation and human trials. The basic research, like that performed to 
clone Dolly, can be enormously expensive, and lack an immediate 
commercial application. Dr. Elias Zerhouni, Director of the National 
Institutes of Health, testified before Congress that: 
We are at a very early stage of embryonic stem cell research, and have a 
great deal of basic research to conduct before we can unlock the poten­
tial of these cells and fulfill their promise . . . .  As is the case at the begin­
ning of any new field of discovery, there is a shortage of researchers with 
expertise in stem cell research. This dearth is currently a rate-limiting 
step in advancing the progress of embryonic stem cell research. Simply 
growing embryonic stem cells to the state where they can be used for ex­
perimentation requires substantial knowledge, training and experience. 
NIH will strive to make stem cell research as attractive as possible to our 
most talented research scientists, whose creativity in developing investi­
gator-initiated research will move the research agenda forward. 34 
In addition, Dr. Zerhouni ·emphasized that there are many steps 
required to develop stem cells from when they are first removed from 
an embryo to the point where they become part of a well­
characterized cell line ready for distribution to the research commu­
nity. As a "first step" in that process, NIH has awarded $4.3 million in 
grants to fund the expansion, testing, quality assurance, and distribu­
tion of cells.35 Once the basic research is completed, preclinical studies, 
including animal experimentation, will need to be done, and only then 
will human trials on small, carefully . selected populations be 
attempted. Under ideal circumstances, it could easily take decades and 
millions of dollars to realize the beneficial results of such research. 
And without demonstrated evidence of the safety and efficacy of such 
32. Nigel Hawkes, Baby Race That May Be.Too Fast for Safety, TIMES (London), Oct 
10, 1998, at 4. 
· 
33. Shannon Brownlee, Designer Babies: Human Cloning Is a Long Way Off, but 
Bioengineered Kids Are Already Here, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 2002, at 25. Nor is there 
any way to know at this stage whether the risk is limited to cytoplasm transfer that mixes 
mtDNA from two different mothers, or extends as well to nuclear transfer. 
34. Status of the Implementation of the Fed. Stem Cell Research Policy: Hearing Before a 
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 5, 7 (2002) (prepared statement 
of Elias Zerhouni, M.D., Director, National Institute of Health, U.S. Dep't of Health and 
Human Services). 
35. Id. 
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treatments, it would be difficult to justify experimentation on diabetic 
children. The Otts may have been willing to try an untested technique 
as their only way to produce a genetically related child; they should be 
far less willing to try such a technique to cure that child of a chronic, 
but not life threatening, ailment. 
The contrast between these two examples illustrates the challenges 
facing any system designed to govern the future of biotechnology. A 
particular line of research, at a critical preliminary stage, may be 
relatively easy to derail or simply to starve from lack of funding. The 
results of that research, however, are unknowable. The research may 
unlock secrets of the cell that hold the key to curing diabetes or 
paralysis, or it may facilitate genetic engineering of athletes with faster 
metabolisms. 
Once the research is developed, however, controlling its use, lim­
iting, for example, "preimplantation diagnosis and screening for 
therapeutic rather than enhancement purposes" (p. 211) becomes a far 
more difficult matter. Egg, sperm, and embryo selection, genetic 
therapy, and drug use (steroids, Ritalin) can be done in a friendly 
jurisdiction or in carefully concealed labs.36 In an example of "fertility 
tourism," for example, Swedes now routinely travel to Denmark for 
artificial insemination with donor sperm in order to circumvent a 
Swedish law that requires identification of the donors.37 If the life of a 
dying child or the ability to conceive were at stake, prospective 
patients and their families would be willing to go to even greater 
lengths to secure treatment. And if an underground practice devel­
oped with respect, for example, to enhancing athletic performance or 
permitting gay and lesbian couples to bear offspring genetically 
related to two, same-sex parents, a whole community might arise 
committed to funding, promoting, and concealing such activities. 
Fukuyama acknowledges these difficulties, but he does not examine 
the motivation necessary to make a new regulatory regime work. 
Doing so will require consideration of two processes that go well 
beyond Fukuyama's book and the existing discourse about 
biotechnology. The first is the creation of consensus. Most existing 
technological developments occurred without serious consideration of 
the wisdom of their adoption. We have begun to wonder about the 
implications of the revolution in information technology only now that 
36. See, e.g., Tom Cohen, Canada Regulates Meth Chemicals, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 
17, 2002, LEXIS, Academic Universe, N.Y. Times Library ("Often called the 'poor man's 
cocaine,' methamphetamine can be made in bathtubs, on kitchen stoves and in car trunks 
from commercially available chemicals. It normally contains ephedrine and pseudoephed­
rinc, found in over-the-counter cold medications."). 
37. Matthew Hill, Sperm Donors "Want to Keep Anonymity," BBC NEWS: WORLD 
EDITION, Oct. 15, 2002 ("Across Denmark last year 336 Swedish women were given donor 
insemination, which resulted in 81 pregnancies - 30 pregnancies more than in Sweden."), 
a vailab/e at h tip:// news. bbc.co. uk '/Uhi/'health/2329675.stm. 
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it is fully upon us. Biotechnology, on the other hand, as Fukuyama's 
book illustrates, touches on deep-seated human hopes and fears. Ill­
considered legislation might derail promising research at the 
same time that more questionable activities may flourish by going 
underground or abroad. The Swedes, unable to command respect for 
their policy of sperm-donor identification, cannot prevent their 
citizens from going to Denmark. The scientific community, which has 
been appalled by religiously motivated proposals for prohibitions on 
stem-cell research, is likely to have few compunctions about moving 
such research to friendlier climates. Genuinely policing biotechnology 
requires not just passing laws, but forging understandings capable of 
winning widespread adherence. 
Second, implementing moral and ethical understandings, if consen­
sus can be forged, requires the alignment of incentives and the desired 
behavior. Fukuyama observes that through the early nineties virtually 
all biomedical research in the United States was federally funded (p. 
214). That meant that the best researchers only undertook federally 
approved projects, overseen by professional boards that developed 
standards for acceptable practices. The biotech industry has since 
doubled in size, with private funding upstaging federal efforts such as 
the Human Genome Project, and more decentralized programs, like 
fertility clinics, flourishing in areas too politically hot to fund with 
public money. Infusion of large amounts of federal or foundation 
grants to underwrite the research is likely to produce greater public 
participation in the decisions about implementation. Care should also 
be given to the development of private consortiums capable of devel­
oping industry standards and seals of approval. But in some areas, 
there will be no substitute for nurturing moral understandings at the 
individual level. Creating internalized codes that not only bar, but 
condemn, steroid-enhanced-athletic performance needs to go hand-in­
glove with the line-drawing between acceptable and unacceptable use 
of genetic knowledge to produce those likely to be the athletes of 
tomorrow. 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever the failings of Our Posthuman Future, Fukuyai;na has 
written a compelling book that rests on a provocative thesis. His most 
important insight is that human beings are messy. We strive for recog­
nition - and dominance. We can be violent - and compassionate. 
We seek autonomy - and community. We are not intrinsically 
trustworthy, but we seek to provide the circumstances in which we can 
trust others. Politics, the state, the sources of restraint on state power, 
rights, and the celebration of freedom and community all come from 
our need to restrain our worst impulses, while encouraging the flour­
ishing of others. We wish to extol genius, even when accompanied by 
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madness, restrain violence without eliminating the capacity for 
self-defense, celebrate creativity even while acknowledging that it may 
interfere with community, and permit ourselves to live together in 
close proximity with a minimum of coercion. The institutions that we 
design to achieve these results depend on the nature of human interac­
tions, and thus their shape fundamentally depends on human nature. 
If we no longer seek recognition or dominance, if we eliminate our 
tendencies toward violence and creativity, if we do not value individu­
ality or autonomy, we do not need the institutions we have, and we 
neither need nor warrant rights designed to promote the welfare of a 
species that has left those values behind. 
What Fukuyama most seeks to prevent is Brave New World.38 He 
fears that Prozac may be a precursor to "soma," the drug in Aldous 
Huxley's world that kept workers contented with their lot (p. 46). 
Genetic engineering could produce Alphas and Betas, football players 
and pianists who become different species. Brain scans may identify 
the sexually deviant and justify their internment or exile. In the 
process, we will have lost our need and demand for democracy. We 
will not be equals, and we will have lost our willingness to demand or 
recognize equal rights. 
Fukuyama has undertaken yeoman work in articulating the 
connection between human tendencies and human institutions that 
has formed the core of his earlier work. What Our Posthuman Future 
curiously fails to do is to develop the political economy of the biotech 
industry in which these decisions will be made. If human nature is 
what has created our current institutions, then Fukuyama must engage 
with human nature in designing new institutions capable of advancing 
his objectives. Once he acknowledges human nature in all its 
complexity, he will face an insolvable dilemma: among the most basic 
human tendencies will be the desire to circumvent anything he devises. 
If the U.S. bans stem-cell research, Sweden or China may endorse it.39 
If the world unites in opposition to cloning, the Raelians may finance 
Caribbean clinics for grieving parents who wish to clone their lost 
children. And athletes will try anything that promises to enhance their 
performance. Our posthuman future may not be inevitable, but it may 
well be beyond the ability of any individual or group to direct. 
38. HUXLEY, supra note 18. 
39. Indeed, Dr. Grifo, the New York University fertility specialist who helped pioneer 
the use of nuclear transfer techniques to assist patients with mitochondrial defects, moved 
his research to China after the FDA attempted to regulate such activities. See Antonio Re­
galado & Karby Leggett, Fertility Breakthrough Raises Questions About Link to Cloning, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2003, at IA (reporting that a team of Chinese and American doctors 
were expected to announce that they had created the first human pregnancy using a DNA­
swapping technology similar to that which created Dolly the sheep). 
